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PREEMPTION OF RECOVERY IN CIGARETTE
LITIGATION: CAN MANUFACTURERS BE SUED FOR
FAILURE TO WARN EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE
COMPLIED WITH FEDERAL WARNING
REQUIREMENTS?
[There are] manifest dangers in trying to discern the tune when
listening to the sounds of Congressional silence.... [Tlhe bene-
fit of the doubt in our Federal system is tilted against Federal
pre-emption of state law .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past three years, consumers have filed hundreds of suits
against cigarette manufacturers2 under a variety of tort theories.3 This
wave of litigation represents the second major assault on cigarette com-
panies in the past twenty-five years.4 Aggregate losses due to potential
suits could approach eighty billion dollars each year which, if passed to
consumers, would triple the price of cigarettes to thirty dollars per car-
1. Tribe, Federalism With Smoke and Mirrors, THE NATION 788, 788-89 (June 7, 1986).
2. By October, 1985, 240 cases had been filed. Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to
Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 809, 809 n.1 (1986). Approxi-
mately 120 tobacco cases were on file as of December 1, 1986. Gidmark, A Tobacco Case
Activist Predicts Success by End of '87, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 9, col. 2.
3. Note, supra note 2, at 809-10.
4. The first wave of litigation began in the late 1950's and continued through the 1960's.
Id. at 809. Eleven cases generated opinions in the state and federal courts in the first wave of
litigation: Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 375
U.S. 865 (1963); Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963), after
remand, 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.
1962), question certified on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th
Cir. 1963), rev'd after remand, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Padovani v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.
1956), on remand, 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Ma. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958); Albright
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 678
(3d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Fine v. Philip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Ross
v. Philip Morris & Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), afl'd, 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), granting new
trial, 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), after remand, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
987 (1965), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Thayer v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 5314 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 1970). See 1.1 TPLR 4.1
(undated citation as provided in the Tobacco Products Litigation Reporter which is available
at the UCLA Law Library).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:867
ton.' Yet, should actions for failure to warn adequately be preempted by
federal legislation, consumers likely will be unable to pass smoking-re-
lated losses6 to cigarette manufacturers since other tort theories of recov-
ery have proven unsuccessful.7
In an opinion resulting from an interlocutory appeal, the Court of
Appeal for the Third Circuit held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (1965 Act),8 as amended (Act),9 preempted plain-
tiff's common-law claims which alleged that cigarette manufacturers
have failed to warn adequately of hazards associated with cigarette smok-
ing.1" This unanimous decision by Circuit Judges Hunter and Sloviter
and District Judge Giles overturned a 1984 district court ruling that
plaintiff's claims were not preempted by the federal statute." District
courts in four other circuits have disagreed on whether common-law tort
claims against cigarette companies for failure to warn are preempted by
federal labeling legislation. 2
5. Tribe, supra note 1, at 788.
6. These losses have been estimated for 1986 at fifty billion dollars in health care costs
and lost productivity. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., SMOKING AND HEALTH:
A NAT'L STATus REPORT 7 (1986).
7. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1423, 1425 (1980). "[W]hen... injuries have been caused by indigenous components of
tobacco smoke, defense counsel for the cigarette industry have compiled a twenty year record
of unbroken court victories." Id. (footnote omitted); see also 1.1 TPLR 4.1. Recently, a Cali-
fornia jury voted nine to three against holding R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. liable in the death of
a lifelong smoker for failing to warn that cigarettes are clinically addictive. The jurors indi-
cated that causation had not been established, and they remained unconvinced that smoking
was addictive. See Kepko, Products Liability-Can It Kick The Smoking Habit, 19 AKRON L.
REv. 269, 290 (1985) (discussing Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 144417 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1985)).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
9. Legislation is codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331-1341 (Supp. 1986) and includes the fol-
lowing subsequent enactments: Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970); Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98474, 98 Stat.
2200 (1984). The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act) enacted § 1340,
enacted provisions set out as notes in §§ 1331, 1333, and 1334, and amended §§ 1331-1339 of
Title 15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331 hist. note (1982). The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
(1984 Act) enacted §§ 1335(a) and 1341, enacted provisions set out as notes in §§ 1331, 1333,
and 1335(a), and amended §§ 1331-1333, 1336, and 1337 of Title 15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331 note
(Supp. 1986). This combined legislation will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. Further
amendments to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87
Stat. 352 (1973); Pub. L. No. 99-92, 99 Stat. 402 (1985); and Pub. L. No. 99-117, 99 Stat. 495
(1985), are not pertinent to this discussion.
10. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
11. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on
interlocutory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
12. A district court within the Fourth Circuit followed the district court Cipollone opin-
ion, finding it "well-reasoned and instructive." Haight v. American Tobacco Co., No. 84-2232
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This Comment considers preemption as it applies to common-law
tort claims against cigarette companies for failure to warn adequately of
the hazards of smoking. Part II will discuss the doctrine of preemption
generally and outline the twenty-two year legislative history of the Act as
it relates to the preemption issue. It will then set forth the tests four
courts have applied to decide whether plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims
are preempted in cigarette cases. Part III will analyze the courts' reason-
ing and Congress' intent with regard to this issue. Finally, this Comment
will propose alternative judicial and legislative solutions and present sev-
eral policy considerations.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Preemption
The doctrine of preemption, which arises from the constitutional
mandate of supremacy, 13 was first articulated in 1824 by United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall:
The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is pro-
duced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme
law. The appropriate application... is to such acts of the State
Legislatures... [as] interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws
of Congress .... In every such case, the act of Congress, or the
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in
the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.
14
Thus, when state and federal laws directly conflict, federal law prevails;
(S.D.W.V. Dec. 26, 1984), reprinted in 1.2 TPLR 2.52, 2.59. A district court in the Sixth
Circuit held that the common-law claim of failure to warn was incompatible with, and there-
fore preempted by, the Act. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), appealfiled, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986). A district court in the
First Circuit held against preemption of similar claims. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appealfiled, No. 86-8019 (1st Cir. June 4, 1986). A
district court in the Eleventh Circuit expressly relied on the reasoning of the Third Circuit
decision in Cipollone to find preemption. Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., No. PCA 86-
4004-RV (N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1986), reprinted in 1.9 TPLR 2.203, 2.204. A New York state
court followed the reasoning in the district court opinions of Cipollone, Haight, and Palmer to
repudiate the logic of the Third Circuit and find against preemption. Montana v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., No. 79850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 1986), reprinted in 1.10 TPLR 2.229.
13. Article six, clause two of the United States Constitution, commonly referred to as the
supremacy clause, states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
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however, when actual conflict is absent, the appropriate resolution is less
obvious. 5 When Congress has not expressly forbidden parallel legisla-
tion in an area the state attempts to regulate, the judiciary will interpret
congressional intent.16 Courts may find a state law impliedly preempted
when that law interferes with federal objectives or impairs federal super-
intendence of the field. "7
[Sltate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not
entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question,
state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.'"
Complicating the issue is another fundamental constitutional con-
cept. There is a "preference in our Federal system for state governments
to have broad powers to make and change their legal policies,"' 9 and a
presumption against preemption which is created by concerns of federal-
ism. 20 State governments have a general police power to protect the
health, safety, welfare or morals of their citizens. This power is limited
only by the federal constitutional checks on state powers and is otherwise
independent of federal scrutiny.2' The maintenance of dual sovereignty
requires a strong presumption that state police powers are not to be su-
perseded by federal legislation unless that is the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress in passing a particular law.22 This "presumption
against preemption... is strengthened where preemption would leave a
putative plaintiff without adequate remedy for violation of his or her
state created rights."123 Yet if these presumptions can be overcome, con-
15. Tribe, supra note 1, at 788.
16. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 208, 224 (1959). "[Tihe Court and only the Court can make the final judgment of
incompatibility required by the supremacy clause." Id.
17. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-93 (2d ed. 1983).
18. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted).
19. Tribe, supra note 1, at 788. "State courts are the final interpreters of state law even
though their actions are reviewable under the federal constitution, treaties, or laws." J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 20.
20. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
21. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 121.
22. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
23. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on
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flicts created by the state judiciary are prohibited no less than conflicts
created by state legislative and executive branches. "[R]egulation can be
as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be,
indeed is designed to be a potent method of governing conduct and con-
trolling policy."'24 Since regulation through monetary damages is one of
two issues critical to a finding of preemption of common-law tort claims
for failure to warn under the Act, this issue will be discussed more thor-
oughly in Part III of this Comment.
1. Express preemption
The supremacy clause precludes state action when state regulation
has been expressly forbidden by federal legislation. When federal law
prohibits a specific act which state law requires, the state law is consid-
ered to be expressly preempted.25 Moreover, Congress may prohibit par-
allel state legislation.26 Yet in the heat of controversy, Congress rarely
articulates an intent to affect state regulation,27 and it remains for courts
to interpret and effectuate the purposes of Congress.2" No court has held
that federal legislation expressly preempts state common-law tort claims
against cigarette companies for failure to warn.29
2. Implied preemption
State regulation is impliedly preempted when the federal govern-
ment intends to "occupy the field" which a state seeks to regulate or
when federal and state regulations "actually conflict."
a. occupation of the field
The United States Supreme Court has found that state laws are pre-
empted by federal occupation of the field when either of two conditions
exist: a pervasive federal regulatory scheme or a federal need for national
interlocutory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563); accord Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
24. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1151 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). Judge Sarokin listed twenty cases in which federal statutes have
preempted state common law in a variety of areas. Id. at 1152.
25. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 292.
26. Id. at 292 n.2.
27. Note, supra note 16, at 209.
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 124-93.
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uniformity.
30
The Court often cites Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.31 to illustrate
occupation of the field. In Rice, Congress legislated the licensing of grain
warehouses, an area of commerce which state regulation traditionally
had occupied.32 The Court began its analysis with the presumption that,
even though Congress had the authority to regulate in this area, state
regulation was not preempted absent clear and manifest congressional
intent.33
The Rice Court held that congressional intent could be inferred
from the pervasiveness of the regulation, the dominance of the federal
interest, a federal purpose parallel with that of the state regulation or
state policy which would lead to results inconsistent with federal objec-
tives.34 The Court found that Congress had acted so unequivocally as to
make clear that it intended no regulation except its own:
[A]s we read the Act, Congress in effect said that the policy
which it adopted in each of the nine [matters] was exclusive of
all others; and that if a licensed warehouseman complied with
each requirement, he did all that he need do. He could not be
required by a State to do more or additional things or conform
to added regulations, even though they in no way conflicted
with what was demanded of him under the Federal Act....
The test, therefore, is whether the matter on which the
State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
Federal Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it is a
more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the
State.
In 1961, the Supreme Court held that federal legislation creating a
uniform standard for grading tobacco sold at auction preempted supple-
mentary state regulations. 6 In Campbell v. Hussey, the Court held that a
Georgia statute which supplemented federal labeling of tobacco for auc-
tion by requiring an additional tag for "Type 14" tobacco was preempted
30. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 293. Chief Justice Warren
announced this test for implied preemption in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05
(1956).
31. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
32. Id. at 229-30.
33. Id. at 230.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 235-36.
36. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961).
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by the federal legislation.37 The Court found preemptive congressional
intent in language of the federal statute which expressly required a "uni-
form standard" for grading tobacco.3" Additionally, a congressional re-
port which reviewed the harm to growers "that resulted from the absence
of regulations governing the 'grades' of tobacco sold in the auction mar-
ket,"39 supported a finding of preemption. Since the legislative purpose
was to ensure standard grading, "complementary state regulation [was]
as fatal as state regulations which conflict[ed] with the federal scheme."'
Congress had intended to occupy the field, and parallel state legislation
was not enforceable.
The Court has not always distinguished occupation of the field from
other theories of preemption. This mixture of analysis is illustrated in
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta.41 In Fidelity,
the Court held that a federal regulation which permitted federal savings
and loan associations to use "due-on-sale" clauses in their mortgage con-
tracts preempted a contrary California rule.42 The California Supreme
Court had limited a federal association's right to exercise a due-on-sale
provision to instances where the lender could show that the transfer im-
paired its security.43 The Court held that "[b]y further limiting the avail-
ability of an option the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board considers
essential to the economic soundness of the thrift industry, the State has
37. Id. at 300.
38. In 1935, Congress enacted the Tobacco Inspection Act, ch. 623, 49 Stat. 731 (1935)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 511 (1980)). This act's declaration of purpose provided:
[Tihe classification of tobacco according to type, grade, and other characteristics af-
fects the prices received therefor by producers; without uniform standards of classifi-
cation and inspection the evaluation of tobacco is susceptible to speculation,
manipulation, and control, and unreasonable fluctuations in prices and quality deter-
minations occur which are detrimental to producers and persons handling tobacco in
commerce; such fluctuations constitute a burden upon commerce and make the use
of uniform standards of classification and inspection imperative for the protection of
producers and others engaged in commerce and the public interest therein.
7 U.S.C. § 51 la (1980), quoted in Campbell, 331 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
39. Campbell, 331 U.S. at 301 (quoting H.R. RaP. No. 1102, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1935)).
40. Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
41. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
42. Id. at 170.
43. Id. at 154-55. A due-on-sale clause is a "contractual provision that permits the lender
to declare the entire balance of the loan immediately due and payable if the property securing
the loan is sold or otherwise transferred." Id. at 145 (footnote omitted). The California
Supreme Court had held that Bank of America's exercise of the due-on-sale clause violated
California's prohibition of unreasonable restraints on alienation "unless the lender [could]
demonstrate that enforcement [was] reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its
security or the risk of default." Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582
P.2d 970, 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1978).
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created 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives' of the due-on-sale regulation.""
The latter analysis is typically used to find preemption based on con-
flict between state and federal regulation, not federal occupation of the
field.
The conflict does not evaporate because the Board's regu-
lation simply permits, but does not compel, federal savings and
loans to include due-on-sale clauses in their contracts and to
enforce those provisions when the security property is trans-
ferred.... [T]he California courts have forbidden a federal sav-
ings and loan to enforce a due-on-sale clause solely "at its
option" and have deprived the lender of the "flexibility" given
it by the Board.4
Furthermore, the Court seemed to hold that conflicting state law was
expressly preempted by the regulation of the Board.47
Thus, although Fidelity is considered to be a case which illustrates
preemption through occupation of the field, the Court reached its conclu-
sion by combining several preemption theories. Implicit in Fidelity, how-
ever, is the pervasiveness of the Board's regulation. "In the preamble
accompanying final publication of the due-on-sale regulation, the Board
explained its intent that the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and
loans be governed 'exclusively by Federal law.' "48
Thus, occupation of the field is a judicially- created test which deter-
mines whether the unexpressed intent of Congress was to regulate an
area exclusively. Preemption will be found under this test based on: (1)
the pervasiveness of the regulation; (2) the dominance of the federal in-
terest; or (3) a federal purpose parallel with that of the state regulation.
49
When occupation of the field is found, any state regulation, even one
which merely supplements the federal regulation, is preempted. The ju-
dicial outcome is typically dependent upon how the field is defined. As
44. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 156 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
49. See supra text accompanying note 34. The Court has been reluctant to hold the third
test to be a sufficient condition for a finding of preemption. "This Court has, on the one hand,
sustained state statutes having objectives virtually identical to those of federal regulations,...
and has, on the other hand, struck down state statutes where the respective purposes were
quite dissimilar." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
(citations omitted).
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applied to cigarette litigation, no court has found that Congress intended
to occupy the field of cigarette labeling.
b. conflict with federal regulation
A second implied preemption test with which the Supreme Court
has construed congressional intent focuses on whether federal legislation
and state regulation conflict in actuality. The Court has found actual
conflict when compliance with both state and federal regulation was
physically impossible or, alternatively, when state regulation frustrated
the congressional purpose.
50
When the preemption test is a physical impossibility, the Court has
cited5 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.52 The preemption
issue in Paul was whether California could apply a California statute to
exclude Florida avocados from California markets on the basis of a high
oil content which nonetheless was acceptable under a federal marketing
order.53 The Court held that while the California statute and the federal
marketing order provided for different minimum levels of oil in the avo-
cados, no actual conflict existed between the two regulatory schemes.
5 4
"The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or
the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be
enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not
whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives."
'55
The Paul Court found, first, that the maturity of avocados tradition-
ally had been regarded as within the scope of state interests. 6 Second,
the Court reasoned, "[flederal regulation by means of minimum stan-
dards.., however comprehensivefor those purposes [picking, processing,
and transportation of agricultural commodities] that regulation may be,
does not ... import displacement of state control over the distribution
and retail sale of those commodities in the interests of the consumers of
the commodities . . . ,,57 The Court held that absent the express com-
50. See supra text accompanying note 18.
51. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. Accord Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158
(1978).
52. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
53. Paul, 373 U.S. at 134-35. The federal marketing regulation was promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to power given him by the Agricultural Adjustment Act:
"to establish and maintain... such minimum standards of quality and maturity.., as will
effectuate such orderly marketing of such agricultural commodities as will be in the public
interest." Paul, 373 U.S. at 138 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 602(3) (1980)).
54. Id. at 141.
55. Id. at 142.
56. Id. at 144.
57. Id. at 145 (emphasis in original).
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mand of Congress, a state could impose standards higher than those fed-
erally required for export on products imported from other states.58
Since the congressional design was deemed by the Court to promote re-
gional cooperation between farmers and growers, and not to affect the
distribution and sale of produce, traditional state power was not
preempted. 9
The Court has found actual conflict when state regulation "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."60 Frustration of congressional purpose has formed the basis
upon which several courts have found failure-to-warn claims against cig-
arette companies preempted by the Act. In Hines v. Davidowitz,61 the
Court stated "[tihere is not-and from the very nature of the problem
there cannot be-any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a uni-
versal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Con-
gress." 62 Commentators have cited Hines to represent occupation of the
field,6" but the Supreme Court has generally cited the case to represent
preemption based on frustration of congressional purpose. 4 The Hines
Court itself did not distinguish occupation of the field from a list of ex-
pressions synonymous with conflict. "This Court, in considering the va-
lidity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the
same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; con-
trary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; in-
consistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." 61 Since language
is the foundation of analysis, the blending of words which describe two
distinct theories of preemption may have concomitantly blurred the ana-
lytical line between frustration of congressional purpose and occupation
of the field.
In Hines, the question before the Court was whether the State of
Pennsylvania could enforce its Alien Registration Act when a federal
Alien Registration Act regulated identical subject matter. 6 The Court
did not decide whether Congress had exclusive power to regulate;67 in-
stead, it found that the federal government had enacted a complete
58. Id.
59. Id. at 150.
60. See supra text accompanying note 18.
61. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
62. Id. at 67.
63. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 293.
64. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. Accord Ray, 435 U.S. at 158.
65. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 60-61.
67. Id. at 62.
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scheme of regulation in the field.68 Thus, the states may not "conflict or
interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce addi-
tional or auxiliary regulations."69 The Hines Court established a broad
test of whether state law violates the intent of Congress.7" "Our primary
function is to determine whether... Pennsylvania's law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."71 The Court held that three factors were impor-
tant in determining whether federal enactments precluded enforcement
of state regulation: (1) the nature of the power exerted by Congress; (2)
the object sought to be obtained; and (3) the character of the obligation
imposed by the law.72
While the Court provided a test which indicated preemption based
on conflict, the language used strongly indicates occupation of the field:
Having the constitutional authority so to do, [Congress] has
provided a standard for alien registration in a single integrated
and all-embracing system in order to obtain the information
deemed to be desirable in connection with aliens . . . . [I]t
plainly manifested a purpose to... protect the personal liber-
ties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registra-
tion system, and to leave them free from the possibility of
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not
only affect our international relations but might also generate
the very disloyalty which the law has intended guarding
against. Under these circumstances, the Pennsylvania Act can-
not be enforced.73
If the Hines Court had found that Congress intended to occupy the field,
it most likely would have held that the federal government had the exclu-
sive power to regulate alien registration.74
Maintaining a principled distinction between frustration of purpose
and occupation of the field is crucial to the issue of preemption in ciga-
rette litigation. If Congress intended to occupy the field of cigarette la-
beling, the courts might agree that common-law tort claims against
68. Id. at 66, 69-70.
69. Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 68. The Court distinguished between congressional power used to further
"rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings, and ... state pure food laws regulat-
ing the labels on cans." Id. The Court held that states were not preempted from regulating
labels on cans when Congress could have regulated them, but had not. See id. at 68 n.22.
73. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
74. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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cigarette companies for failure to warn are an infringement on the federal
prerogative. Yet, no court has held that Congress so intended.
More recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court is not
eager to presume or infer congressional intent, and will refuse to do so
absent "persuasive reasons evidencing congressional intent favoring pre-
emption . . .."I Whether federal preemption is based on the express
mandate of Congress, the judicial interpretation of Congress' intent
through its occupation of the field, or the conflict of state and federal law,
the doctrine of preemption inevitably requires that the Court interpret a
federal statute. This Comment will now outline the twenty-two year leg-
islative history of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act as
it relates to the preemption issue.
B. Legislative History
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965 Act)
76
took effect on January 1, 1966,17 and terminated on July 1, 1969.78 The
Act was Congress' response to the Surgeon General's landmark 1964 re-
port which stated, "Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient
importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial ac-
tion." 9 The principal purpose of the bill was to "provide adequate
warning to the public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking."
'80
The 1965 Act statement of policy, which has not been subsequently
amended, states:
DECLARATION OF POLICY
Sec. 2. It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of the
Act, to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with
cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relation-
ship between smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning
to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
75. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 295.
76. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339
(Supp. III 1985)).
77. Id. § 11, 79 Stat. 284.
78. Id. § 10, 79 Stat. 284.
79. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2351.
80. Id. at 2350. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported that labeling
should "neither mislead nor fail to give the consumer the information concerning the product
that he needs in order to make an informed decision." Id. at 2357. "Such cautionary state-
ment should.., not be weakened in its impact .... S. REP. No. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1965).
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(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) pro-
tected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared pol-
icy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to
any relationship between smoking and health.8 1
Balancing the right to choose to smoke with the right to know of
health hazards,8 2 Congress specified a compulsory warning to be carried
on each package of cigarettes manufactured, imported, or packaged for
sale in the United States.83 Further, Congress provided an express pre-
emption clause:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other
than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be
required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
Act.
84
At that time, as expressed in the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee's report to Congress, Congress was concerned with preempt-
ing only the executive branches of state and local governments.8 5 The
primary congressional concern was that cigarette labeling be shielded
from state and local authorities seeking to protect the health of their citi-
zens by mandating a more stringent warning through an exercise of their
traditional police powers.8 6 Furthermore, congressional debate prior to
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1982).
82. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352.
83. The 1965 Act provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or package for sale
or distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to
bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to
Your Health." Such statement shall be located in a conspicuous place on every ciga-
rette package and shall appear in conspicuous and legible type in contrast by ty-
pography, layout, or color with other printed matter on the package.
Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 283.
84. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. 283.
85. This inference may be drawn from the concerns stated by Rep. John E. Moss of Utah:
Should the Congress pass... [the Act] as recommended in the majority report of the
committee, it would in effect make a "sacred cow" out of the cigarette industry in
U.S. commerce by shielding this industry from any future requirements concerning
health warnings in tobacco advertisements which might be otherwise imposed by
Federal, State, or local authorities.
1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2365. The "authorities" referred to were the
"traditional guardians of public health" which would not be able to "protect their citizens if
they believe a warning statement in cigarette advertising would do so." Id. at 2366.
86. Id. at 2366. Rep. Moss further stated, "I cannot conceive of any sound reason why the
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the passage of the 1965 Act recognized the continued existence of com-
mon-law products liability cases, and the negative effect which the re-
quired warnings might have on a plaintiff's cause of action for failure to
warn.
87
When the 1965 Act expired, Congress replaced it with the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act)." Acting in the face
of reports that the first label had been ineffective 9 and that a stronger
message was needed,90 Congress strengthened the requisite label to state
"Warning: The Surgeon General has Determined That Cigarette Smok-
ing is Dangerous to Your Health."9  Preceding passage of the 1969 Act,
more than ninety House members had either introduced or cosponsored
bills dealing with cigarette labeling and advertising and almost all had
sought stronger label warnings.92 Further, the 1969 Act prohibited tele-
vision and radio broadcasting of cigarette advertising on or after January
1, 1971.
93
While the Declaration of Policy remained unchanged,94 Congress
amended the second paragraph of the preemption section to read "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of the Act." 95 The preemption clause, section 5, was retroac-
tively effective July 1, 1969, in order to insure that "no State or local law
sale and advertising of cigarettes should be granted Federal protection from States and local
regulations which are more stringent than Federal Regulations." Id.
87. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1162-63 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on
interlocutory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
88. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(Supp. III 1985)).
89. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported in 1967 that "[tihere is virtually no
evidence that the warning statement on cigarette packages has had any significant effect."
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2655.
90. A 1968 Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) report to Congress
stated, "The warning statement required by the [Act] should be strengthened. This Depart-
ment would support the wording recommended last year by the Federal Trade Commission, or
a suitable paraphrase of the wording." Id. at 2655 (footnote omitted). "The wording recom-
mended... was 'Warning: Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Health and May Cause Death
From Cancer and Other Diseases."' Id. at 2655 n.1. In its 1969 Report, the FTC recom-
mended that the following warning be required on cigarette packages: "Warning: Cigarette
Smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer, coronary heart disease,
chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema and other diseases." Id. at 2657.
91. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 88.
92. 130 CONG. REC. S11,850 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984).
93. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6 (1970), 84 Stat. 89.
94. Id. § 2, 84 Stat. 87.
95. Id. § 5(b), 84 Stat. 88. The entire preemption clause was written as follows:
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which... establishes any requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health with respect to cigarette advertising could be held to be valid
for the period between July 1, 1969, and the date the legislation finally
becomes law, or any portion thereof."' 96 The 1969 Act additionally de-
fined "State" to include "any political division of any state." 97
In December 1969, the Senate Commerce Committee reported to
Congress its rationale for amending the preemption clause and for in-
cluding a definition of "State" in the proposed legislation:
In some instances, counties or municipalities exercise their
authority over advertising by local ordinances, or regulations,
or even occasionally by resolution. In order to avoid the chaos
created by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations, however,
the bill preempts State requirements or prohibitions with re-
spect to the advertising of cigarettes based on smoking and
health. This preemption is intended to include not only action
by State statute but by all other administrative actions or local
ordinances or regulations by any political subdivision of any
State.
98
The House expressed its intent to preempt both state and federal
regulatory agencies from legislating cigarette labeling requirements:
By extending the act, the bill effectively continues the current
absolute prohibition placed upon all regulatory agencies, fed-
eral and State. None may interfere with or place any limitation
upon cigarette advertising, nor can they require any other cau-
tion to be placed upon a cigarette package than is already pro-
vided by the bill.
... Refusal to surrender congressional function to the reg-
ulatory agencies is the meaning of the 30-word preemption pro-
vision, section 5(b) of H.R. 6543. 99
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement re-
quired by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
Id. § 5, 84 Stat. 88.
96. 116 CONG. REc. 7922 (1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers).
97. Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 3(3), 84 Stat. 88. The congressional purpose was to make clear
that preemption applied to cities, counties and other political subdivisions of the states as well
as the states themselves. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2663.
98. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2652, 2663 (emphasis added).
99. 115 CONG. REC. 16,159 (1969) (statement of Rep. Quillen). In the House, preemption
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Most provisions of the 1969 Act are in effect today.1° The pre-
emption clause has not been modified since 1970.10' In 1984, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act (1984 Act),102 parts
of which were codified in title 15 of the United States Code. 103 The con-
gressional purpose is stated in section 2: "It is the purpose of this Act to
provide a new strategy for making Americans more aware of any adverse
health effects of smoking, to assure the timely and widespread dissemina-
tion of research findings and to enable individuals to make informed deci-
sions about smoking."'"
Consistent with its stated purpose, Congress again provided that
more specific and stringent labeling be conspicuously displayed on ciga-
rette packages. 10 5 Since October 12, 1985, the following warnings are
required to be rotated quarterly, sized fifty percent larger than they had
been previously, and to appear on all cigarette packages manufactured,
packaged, or imported for sale or distribution in the United States:
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Compli-
cate Pregnancy.
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pre-
ganant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth,
And Low Birth Weight.
"SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke
Contains Carbon Monoxide."
10 6
Congress in 1984 emphasized only its goal of informing the public.
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce intended the variety of
messages combined with broad based educational activities to assist the
public in making an informed decision about whether or not to smoke.'
0 7
was targeted against the federal as well as the state regulatory agencies. Representative Quil-
len went on to predict a scenario if Congress failed to assert its supremacy through a preemp-
tion clause: "The Federal Trade Commission will force all cigarette advertising to include
such dire warnings of disease and death, that the industry would be compelled to stop advertis-
ing entirely." Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (Supp. 111 1985).
101. Id. § 1334.
102. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of title 15).
103. See supra note 9.
104. Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 2, 98 Stat. 2200.
105. Id. § 4, 98 Stat. 2201-2203.
106. Id.
107. H.R. RaP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3718, 3725. The committee held hearings for five days in 1982 and 1983.
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Further, the Committee recommended the program with the belief that it
ultimately would cause a reduction in smoking rates."' 8 A major focus of
the 1984 Act was to assist smokers in quitting smoking and to discourage
young people from starting. 10 9 Less mention was made of the second
purpose declared by Congress in 1965-that of protecting the national
economy from "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling...
regulation." ' In the 1984 Act, no new preemption clause was included,
nor was preemption mentioned in the congressional debate or the unoffi-
cial legislative history.111
Most recently, Congress passed a bill regulating the tobacco indus-
try's labeling of its smokeless products, such as snuff and chewing to-
bacco. 1 2 The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act
of 1986 (Smokeless Act) 1 3 "for the most part, simply extends the provi-
sions of P.L. 98-474, the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of
1984, to include smokeless tobacco products."' 14 The Smokeless Act
makes it unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or import for
sale or distribution any smokeless tobacco product unless one of three
During the course of the hearings, the committee heard about a successful Swedish system
which combined varying warning messages with a broad-based educational program to dra-
matically reduce the rate of smoking in that country, particularly among young people. Id.
108. Id.
109. 130 CONG. Rnc. H9226 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1984) (statements of Reps. Synar and
Dingell).
110. See supra text accompanying note 81.
111. See generally 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3718.
112. Recently, consumption of smokeless tobacco has been increasing rapidly.
While cigarette consumption had risen from 49 cigarettes per person in 1900 to 3,958
per person in 1962, consumption of chewing tobacco had fallen from 4.10 pounds per
person to 0.50 pounds per person during the same period. Consumption of snuff
declined slightly ....
... [Moist snuff is [now] the fastest-growing product in the entire tobacco in-
dustry with poundage gains of 7 percent in 1984.
... [L]egislation to require warning labels and limit advertising have established
a public awareness of the dangers of cigarette smoking. There has been no parallel
development of public information on the dangers of smokeless tobacco use.
S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in April 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7, 10.
113. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986), reprinted in Apr. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS.
114. S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in Apr. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7, 11.
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warnings appears conspicuously on the package.11 5 Primary congres-
sional concern involved effectiveness of required warnings on smokeless
tobacco packages 1 6 The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources reported Senate Bill 1574 "as a timely and necessary measure to
facilitate a national public education and research effort to make our
citizens more aware of the health consequences of using smokeless
tobacco."
1 17
Although the Smokeless Act regulates a different tobacco product
category than does the 1984 Act, the language, purpose and method of
implementing the two statutes are nearly identical.118 The wording in
the preemption clause of the Smokeless Act is more precise, however,
than its cigarette counterpart written fifteen years earlier.
(a) No Statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco
products and health, other than the statements required by
[this Smokeless Act], shall be required by any Federal agency
to appear on any package or in any advertisement . . . of a
smokeless tobacco product.
(b) No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco
products and health, other than the statements required by
[this Smokeless Act], shall be required by any State or local
statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any
advertisement ... of a smokeless tobacco product.119
The Senate Committee report stated that manufacturers, packagers, and
importers may add warnings to the three required by the Smokeless
115. Apr. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7, 16. These warnings, which would
be rotated every four months, are:
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER;
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH LOSS;
WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIG-
ARETTES.
Id.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 11.
118. Not only do both acts legislate specific rotational labeling, but they both require the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct and support research of the effect of the
respective products on human health; to collect, analyze and disseminate studies resulting
from the research; develop or coordinate educational programs relating to the effect of the
respective products on human health; and report to Congress biennially the effects of the Sec-
retary's efforts on public consumption. See S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 16-17
(1985); Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 3(a), (c), 98 Stat. 2200-2201.
119. Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 7(a), (b), 100 Stat. 34. Cf supra text accompanying note 84 and
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Act. 2° Furthermore, the Committee emphasized that, by including
health warnings on packages, and by preempting state and local laws
requiring additional warnings, it did not intend to preempt product lia-
bility suits based on failure to warn.1 21  This intent was manifested in
120. S. REP. No. 209, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in Apr. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7, 13.
121. Apr. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7, 13. The congressional debate prior
to the passage of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco and Health Education Act of 1986
(Smokeless Act) clearly indicated that plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were not preempted,
and insinuated that this might be the congressional intent behind the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act, as amended, as well. 131 CONG. REc. S17,680 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1985). Mr. Danforth, Chairman of the Commerce Committee stated: "Tobacco products are
unique. Unlike many other products which may be hazardous only when misused, these prod-
ucts pose health hazards when used as intended." Id. at S17,681. Mr. Danforth is later quoted
as follows:
It is my understanding that S. 1574 in no way addresses the question of product
liability and is not intended to alter current product liability law with respect to the
duties and rights of manufacturers and consumers of smokeless tobacco products-
that S. 1574 leaves to the courts in each particular case the question of what signifi-
cance will be given to the health warnings required by this legislation....
I would ask the chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee
whether this understanding is correct ....
Id. at S17,682. Mr. Hatch replied:
The distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee is correct. S. 1574 is not
intended to have any impact whatsoever upon current product liability law. On the
contrary, I would like to stress on behalf of the Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee, and as a matter of legislative history, that this legislation is not intended to
alter or affect the current status of product liability law and is not intended to either
enhance or diminish any rights, causes of action, or defenses available under current
product liability law.
Id. Mr. Lugar, as the original cosponsor of the legislation, agreed with this assessment as a
matter of legislative history. Id.
On December 19, the House discussed S. 1574.
Mr. WAXMAN. . . . [O]ur proposal does try to develop a very visible way of
displaying the warning label on the advertising, and it would have in its display a
circle and an arrow to draw people's attention to that label. We want people to see
the warning label, and hopefully they will be discouraged voluntarily from using this
substance.
Mr. BLILEY. .... Mr. Speaker, this is a more stringent provision than is re-
quired on cigarettes at the present time, and I would be forced to object.
Mr. ROSE. Mr. Speaker. My information is that the smokeless tobacco indus-
try has signed off on what the gentleman from California is attempting to do. Is that
not correct?
Mr. BLILEY. That is correct, but the smokeless-tobacco industry is a small
part of the industry, as the gentleman knows.
Mr. ROSE. But this bill only affects the smokeless-tobacco industry.
Mr. BLILEY. At the present time, yes, but the effects will be brought back on
the others.
131 CONG. Rc. H13,311 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985).
Senator Kennedy, the ranking minority member of the Labor and Human Resources
Committee, remarked: "'[T]he Senate concurs in the statement by the managers of the House
side and in our original committee report that we do not, by passage of this legislation, intend
... to preempt product liability suits in State or Federal courts based on failure to warn.'"
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a "savings clause" preserving common-law claims of prospective
plaintiffs. 1
22
No "savings clause" preserves state common-law tort actions in cig-
arette-labeling legislation. Legislative discussion on this subject, both in
the Congressional Record and in the committee hearings, is lacking.
Thus, federal legislation has not disposed of the preemption issue as it
relates to common-law actions brought against cigarette companies
which have complied with federally mandated warning requirements.
Six federal courts have construed congressional intent in this area, how-
ever, and they have divided evenly on either side of the issue. The fol-
lowing section will set forth the analyses through which four'2 3 of these
courts have made their determinations. The cases are presented in
chronological order.
C. Preemption in the Cigarette Cases
1. First impression: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
In what is generally considered to be one of the more scholarly mod-
em opinions involving the doctrine of preemption, 124 New Jersey Federal
District Court Judge Sarokin made the first judicial determination of
whether the preemption doctrine applied to common-law tort cases
brought against cigarette companies for failure to warn adequately of the
potential hazards of tobacco smoking.125 In the introduction to his opin-
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986) (quoting 132 CONG.
REc. S 1124 (1986)). The Palmer court concluded: "It seems certain, therefore, that Congress
believes that allowing products liability suits involving the adequacy of cigarette warnings will
not frustrate its objective of uniform warnings." Id.
122. "Nothing in this Act shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under
State statutory law to any other person." Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 7(c), 100 Stat. 34 (1986).
123. The two other courts provided citations to one or more of these four cases in place of
independent analysis. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
124. A federal district court in the First Circuit cited Judge Sarokin's opinion along with a
1959 United States Supreme Court opinion for the proposition that regulation can be effec-
tively exerted through an award of damages. Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v.
Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 282 (D. Mass. 1986). A Missouri Court of Appeals
cited the same opinion as the sole authority for the proposition that the question of preemption
is largely a matter of statutory construction and cannot be resolved by "mechanistic formu-
lae." Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In a footnote,
the Missouri court paid tribute to the scholarliness of Judge Sarokin's opinion. "In Cipollone,
the court describes the development and application of the preemption doctrine in scholarly
detail." Id. at 857 n.1. Another federal district court in the First Circuit referred to Judge
Sarokin's opinion as "exhaustive and scholarly." Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
1171, 1173 (D. Mass. 1986).
125. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on interlocu-
tory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
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ion, Judge Sarokin wrote:
This case presents the issue of whether cigarette manufacturers
can be subjected to tort liability, if they have complied with the
federal warning requirement .... In effect, the cigarette indus-
try argues that such compliance immunizes it from liability to
anyone who has chosen to smoke cigarettes notwithstanding
the warning, that the federal legislation has created an ir-
rebutable presumption that the risk of injury has been assumed
by the consumer. This court rejects that contention.
The clear purpose of the federal legislation was to establish
a uniform warning which would prevail throughout the coun-
try. By so doing, cigarette manufacturers would not be sub-
jected to varying requirements from state to state. However,
the existence of the present federally mandated warning does
not prevent an individual from claiming that the risks of smok-
ing are greater than the warning indicates, and that therefore
such warning is inadequate.
... Whether the present federally mandated warning is
adequate and whether defendants have wrongfully attempted to
neutralize that warning are thus issues which survive the fed-
eral statute and are not preempted by it.
126
Rose Cipollone, who was dying of lung cancer at the time of trial,
alleged fourteen counts of strict liability, negligence, intentional tort and
breach of warranty against three defendants. 127 Defendants asserted an
affirmative defense that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the 1965
Act as amended by the 1969 Act. 2 ' Plaintiff then moved to strike the
defense and one defendant1 29 made a cross-motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 130
a. express preemption
Judge Sarokin first determined that the 1969 Act expressly pre-
empted states from imposing regulations requiring a warning other than
126. Id. at 1148.
127. Id. at 1149. The defendants were Liggett Group, Inc., Loew's Theatres, Inc. (Loril-
lard), and Philip Morris, Inc. Id. at 1146.
128. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(Supp. III 1985)). See generally supra text accompanying notes 76-123.
129. Defendant Loew's Theatres made the cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Ci-
pollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
130. Id.
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that federally mandated.'31 The next issue was whether common-law
causes of action rose to the level of a "requirement or prohibition" im-
posed under state law.132 Plaintiff argued that her claims did not amount
to regulation of cigarette labeling, but were designed merely to compen-
sate her for the harmful effect of an inadequate warning. She contended
that if Congress had wished to preempt her claim, it easily could have
included such a statement in the preemption clause of the Act.1 33 De-
fendants argued that state tort law has a regulatory effect expressly pre-
empted by the Act's preemption clause. In addition, they argued that
Congress easily could have included a statement saving the tort claims of
individual plaintiffs if it had so intended.
134
The court determined that Congress could have spoken to deny or
to allow plaintiff's common-law claims, but had not so spoken.1 35 Nor
was it sufficiently clear to the court that a common-law claim amounted
to a "requirement or prohibition" so as to be preempted expressly by the
1969 Act. 136 The court held that, by shifting the burden of losses, tort
actions may have some secondary regulatory effect,' 37 but they "merely
create[ ] some probability of changing the behavior of those upon whom
[they] impose[ ] liability . . . without dictating the form of such
change."' 13  In defining the differences between regulation and motiva-
tion, a distinction which is applicable to implied as well as express pre-
emption analysis, the court quoted and relied on "the one scholar who
has explored this particular question."'
139
"When a court imposes liability for failure to adequately warn,
no specific 'statement relating to smoking and health' is being
required. The practical effect of this may be that cigarette com-
panies will choose to add an addiction warning so as to avoid
future liability. A damages award, however, requires only pay-
ment-it is not an injunction requiring the defendant to incor-
porate into its advertising a fixed legend different from the
federally required label. The labeling acts do not prohibit a
manufacturer from warning of undisclosed health risks. The
131. Id. at 1150. For the text of the preemption clause, see supra note 95 and accompany-
ing text.
132. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1154.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1155.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1156.
139. Id.
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only prohibition is against a state agency passing a law requir-
ing cigarette companies to use a different label."'"'
Since the court did not find clarity in Congress' wording sufficient for a
finding of express preemption, it next turned to the question of whether
plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted by the 1969
Act. 141
b. implied preemption
In order to determine whether plaintiff's claims were impliedly pre-
empted by the 1969 Act, the court first considered whether Congress had
intended to occupy the field of cigarette labeling and deny cigarette man-
ufacturers the right to provide additional labeling. 42 Defendants con-
tended that Congress had demonstrated its intent to occupy the field by
providing a pervasive scheme of federal regulation aimed at avoiding
conflicting labeling requirements. 43 The court agreed that Congress
intended to occupy a field and that it indicated this intent as
clearly as it knew how .... However the legislative history of
the Act, as well as its language, persuades the court that the
field it occupied does not encompass the common law products
liability claims here asserted. That field was expressly limited
to "cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any rela-
tionship between smoking and health" . . . [and] proscribes
state or local action that would require a particular statement
on cigarette packages .... 14
Further, the court agreed that Congress had established a pervasive
scheme of regulation and had expressed the dominant federal interests in
the fields sought to be regulated. Nevertheless, the court stated that
Congress did not "address itself to the problem of compensating the vic-
tims of cigarette smoking, and/or imposing civil liability on cigarette
companies." '45 The court reasoned that the problem Congress ad-
dressed, informing the American public of the hazards of cigarette smok-
ing and protecting the economy consistent with that end,1 46 was different
140. Id. (quoting Garner, supra note 7, at 1454).
141. Id. at 1156-57.
142. Id. at 1157-71. See generally supra text accompanying notes 13-75.
143. Id. at 1164.
144. Id. (quoting and citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1334(a) (1982)); see id. at 1157-64 for an extensive discussion of the history of the
1965 and 1969 Acts.
145. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1164.
146. Id. at 1149 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
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from the products liability issue raised in Cipollone.147 Since two differ-
ent areas were implicated, the court held that federal occupation of the
field could not be a proper basis for preempting plaintiff's common-law
claim.
148
The court next examined the question of whether state tort law con-
flicted with the federal legislation. The test applied was whether an irrec-
oncilable conflict existed between the federal and state standards.
Resolution of the question turned on whether compliance with both stan-
dards was impossible or whether the state law interfered with the accom-
plishment of congressional objectives.
149
First, Judge Sarokin noted that compliance with the 1969 Act and
with a tort award was not impossible:
At most, state law imposes liability in the form of damages
upon defendants. Payment of such damages, as well as fulfill-
ment of the labeling requirements of the Act, are clearly possi-
ble. Indeed, the imposition of criminal liability under the Act,
as well as the payment of damages, are both possible ...
[Common law liability] allows parties to choose between risk-
ing further liability by not changing their behavior, or attempt-
ing to negate such risk by... adding a more stringent label to a
cigarette package. Which course of action one takes is a matter
of choice; one cannot be enjoined or held criminally liable for
the course taken.
150
Judge Sarokin reasoned that since the 1969 Act did not make it unlawful
for the tobacco industry to place additional warnings on cigarette pack-
ages, even a requirement of additional warnings could physically be
achieved while complying with the federal legislation.'
Finally, the court considered whether the existence of state common
law stood as an obstacle to the congressional purpose in passing the 1969
Act. The court concluded that Congress had intended that state com-
mon law survive; therefore, common-law claims did not frustrate the
purpose of Congress.152 "That congressional intent is ... clear: state
common law claims existed prior to passage of the Act, were assumed to
147. Id. at 1164.
148. Id.; see id. at 1165 for a discussion of the limited scope of the 1969 Act and the limited
remedies available under the Act.
149. Id. at 1166.
150. Id. at 1167.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1168. The court compared this case to Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 256 (1984), finding that in both cases Congress intended not to interfere with state com-
mon law, and that tension between the federal legislation and the state law must be tolerated.
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have a continued existence during the legislative process, and were not
eliminated by the passage of the Act."
15 3
The court found two purposes in Congress' enactment of the ciga-
rette-labeling legislation. First, the Act was designed to ensure the con-
tinued vitality of the tobacco industry, as well as the health of the
economy, by preserving individual freedom to choose to smoke. Second,
Congress sought to combat a growing health problem through concise
and unambiguous warning labels designed to inform the public ade-
quately of the risks associated with smoking.154
Judge Sarokin stated that one of the ways in which Congress sought
to assure the continued vitality of the cigarette industry was by regulat-
ing uniformity of labeling. 5 The court reasoned that state common-law
claims need not be preempted in order to ensure that cigarette manufac-
turers will not be subjected to multiple or conflicting labeling require-
ments. "Plaintiffs may not prevail in these lawsuits and, if they do,
manufacturers may not respond to such suits by altering their labels or
changing their advertising practices."' 56
Defendants further argued that if the cigarette industry were to re-
spond to successful common-law claims by adding warnings to cigarette
packages, this response would dilute the effectiveness of the legislated
warnings and undermine the primary purpose of the Act. Judge Sarokin
stated that this argument was without merit. "Congress feared not
stronger, but weaker statements; only the former would be encouraged
by state tort recoveries."' 57 Thus, plaintiff's common-law claim did not
conflict with the purposes of the federal legislation, and no basis existed
for finding that Rose Cipollone's claims were preempted by federal legis-
lation.158 The court granted plaintiff's motion to strike the defenses and
denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.'
59
2. Preemption found: Roysdon v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co.
The next year, a Tennessee district court reached an opposite con-
clusion on facts similar to those in Cipollone. Plaintiff, Floyd Roysdon,
brought two actions against R.J. Reynolds: (1) failure to warn and fully
153. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168; see also id. at 1162-63 for an analysis of congressional
debate prior to the passage of the 1965 Act indicating congressional belief that common-law
tort causes of action for failure to warn would be left in place after passage of that act.
154. Id. at 1166.
155. Id. at 1169; see also supra text accompanying note 83.
156. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169.
157. Id. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1171.
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apprise him of the medical risks involved in smoking, and (2) producing
an unreasonably dangerous and defective product, causing him to suffer
severe peripheral vascular disease. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the
first cause of action holding this claim to be incompatible with, and
therefore preempted by, the Act. The court then held that plaintiff had
failed to prove his case and directed a verdict for the defendant on the
second claim.
160
In a brief opinion, the Roysdon court decided that compliance with
the federal labeling requirement was an adequate defense to a common-
law tort claim as a matter of law. It relied on a 1963 preemption case,
Sperry v. Florida,161 which held that a state law must yield when incom-
patible with federal legislation.'62 From the language in the Act, 63 the
court found that Congress intended to "inform the public of the health
hazards related to smoking" and to "insure uniformity of labeling."'
64
The court held that exposing a manufacturer to potential damages for
doing no more than complying with the Act would achieve indirectly
what the state was expressly preempted from doing directly. The court
reasoned that this was a way of "requiring" a more stringent label, and
thwarting "the stated intent of Congress to have uniformity in the warn-
ings."' 165 Under Tennessee law, consumer knowledge of the hazards of
smoking prevented any chance of recovery on the substantive tort
issue. 16
6
3. Cipollone overturned
The Third Circuit reversed the district court Cipollone decision,
holding that the Act did preempt state common-law remedies in this
area.' 67 Plaintiff, who had fied her original complaint August 1, 1983,
subsequently died in October 1984. Plaintiff's husband continued prose-
cution both in his individual capacity and as executor of his wife's estate
after two of the defendants, Liggett Group, Inc., and Loew's Theatres
160. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1985),
appealfiled, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986).
161. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
162. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
163. See supra text accompanying note 83.
164. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
165. Id. at 1191 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959)).
166. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191-92. "Knowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to
health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community.
For this reason .... this Court finds that the plaintiffs did not make aprimafacie case that the
defendant's products are 'unreasonably dangerous.'" Id. at 1192.
167. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986).
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(Lorillard) appealed the district court ruling. 168
The appellate court analysis paralleled that of the lower court as it
reviewed the Act, general preemption principles, and express preemption
principles as they applied to the Act.169 In determining whether the Cip-
polones' claims were impliedly preempted, Judge Hunter found the legis-
lative history informative but not dispositive. In addition, the court
found the "language of the statute itself a sufficiently clear expression of
congressional intent without resort to the Act's legislative history."17
The appellate court agreed with the district court that regulation of label-
ing was not so pervasive as to dictate a finding of congressional intent to
occupy the field, and preempt private rights of action. 71
The Third Circuit then examined whether the failure-to-warn claims
actually conflicted with the Act. "The test enunciated by this court for
addressing a potential conflict between state and federal law requires us
'to examine first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of
the operation of the state law on these purposes.' "I72 The court stated
that the explicit language denoting the Act's purposes 7 ' "represents a
carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning the public of
the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of the na-
tional economy."174 Moreover, the court reasoned that a reading of the
Act's preemption clause,17 5 combined with its declaration of purpose,
"makes clear Congress's determination that this balance would be upset
by... a requirement of a warning other than that prescribed ....,176
The court then proceeded to evaluate the "effect" of state common-law
actions on the purposes of the Act.
Applying the principle that state law damage claims have a regula-
tory effect on defendants, the appellate court concluded that "claims re-
lating to smoking and health that result in liability for noncompliance
with warning, advertisement, and promotion obligations other than those
prescribed in the Act have the effect of tipping the Act's balance of pur-
poses and therefore actually conflict with the Act." 17 7 The court held:
168. Id.
169. Id. at 184-85.
170. Id. at 186.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 187 (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane)); see
also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
173. See supra text accompanying note 81.
174. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (citing Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405
F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
175. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
176. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
177. Id.
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[(1) T]he Act preempts those state law damage actions re-
lating to smoking and health that challenge.., the adequacy of
the warning on cigarette packages .... [(2) W]here the success
of a state law damage claim necessarily depends on the asser-
tion that a party bore the duty to provide a warning to consum-
ers in addition to the warning Congress has required on
cigarette packages, such claims are preempted as conflicting
with the Act.
1 78
The Third Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling striking appellants'
preemption defenses, but did not determine which of the Cipollones'
claims were preempted by the Act. Instead, it remanded the case to dis-
trict court for "further development of the claims and theories of the
parties."'
17 9
4. District court in the First Circuit rejects Third Circuit holding:
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.
Faced with a preemption issue identical to that addressed in Cipol-
lone and Roysdon, a district court in the First Circuit found against pre-
emption, contrary to the Third Circuit holding, but in agreement with
the district court decision in Cipollone. In Palmer,18 the wife of the de-
ceased, Joseph Palmer, filed suit on her own behalf and as administratrix
of the estate of the deceased against defendants, Liggett Group, Inc. and
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., cigarette manufacturers and distributors.
She claimed that defendants failed to provide adequate warnings about
the harmful effects of smoking cigarettes, and specifically "L & M" ciga-
rettes. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's
claims were preempted by the Act. 181
In support of their motion, defendants argued that the effect of a
verdict against them for failure to warn would impose a "requirement or
prohibition" with respect to advertising of their products thereby contra-
vening the express intent of Congress in the Act's Declaration of Pol-
icy.1 82 The court disagreed, noting that Congress did not expressly
preempt tort action as it had in other public laws. Judge Mazzone rea-
soned that Congress' omission of a "savings clause," expressly preserving
178. Id. (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 187-88. See infra text accompanying notes 309-13 for a discussion of the remand
opinion.
180. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appeal
filed, No. 86-8019 (Ist Cir. June 4, 1986).
181. Id. at 1172.
182. Id. at 1174. See supra text accompanying note 81 for the Act's Declaration of Policy,
§ 1331(b).
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the right of plaintiffs to bring common-law claims for failure to ade-
quately warn, was "not as probative as its omission of a specific prohibi-
tion of common law claims because of the presumption against
preemption." ' 3 Finally, the court stated that the meaning of "require-
ment or prohibition" did not equate to compensation of a negligence vic-
tim because cigarette companies are not required to change their labels in
the face of monetary judgments, but may "keep them the same and pay
for the injuries they cause."' 84
Defendants next argued that plaintiff's claims were impliedly pre-
empted because Congress intended to occupy the entire field of cigarette
labeling and advertising.18 ' The Palmer court held that "although Con-
gress intended to occupy a field, that field did not include private 'rights
and remedies traditionally defined solely by state law.' "1186 The court
reasoned that the Act did not create a particularly pervasive regulatory
scheme, that congressional silence took on added significance absent an
alternative basis for plaintiff recovery, and that the express federal inter-
est in uniform cigarette labeling was distinct from the traditional state
interest in remedying the personal injuries of its citizens.'87
The court reasoned that an imposition of damages would not con-
ffict with the Act because it was possible for a defendant both to comply
with the Act and pay a damage award. l88 Defendants argued that it
would be impossible to comply with federal labeling and diverse state
labeling requirements in interstate commerce with cigarette packages
transported by both consumers and distributors. The court held that
"defendants' argument is fatally flawed in equating damage awards with
direct state regulation."' 18 9
Should defendant choose to add an additional warning because
they are found negligent in one state, that would not cause
them to run afoul of another state's "regulations" if the pack-
age crossed state lines. This is because the states, in granting
compensation to victims, are not imposing regulations concern-
ing labeling. Furthermore, the Act does not exclude other
warnings in addition to the federal one, it simply requires that
the federal warning be present and prohibits states or the fed-
183. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1174-75.
184. Id. at 1175.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1176 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir.
1986)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1177.
189. Id.
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eral government from requiring any different warnings.1 90
The court further held that plaintiff's common-law claims did not
frustrate the purposes and objectives of the Act. It reasoned that Con-
gress had struck a balance in the Act between two somewhat inconsistent
goals: labeling which would adequately inform the public of the health
hazards of smoking, and labeling "requirements" which were not "di-
verse, nonuniform, and confusing" so as to impede commerce. 19' The
balance had been struck by "requiring... a uniform federal warning
label, and prohibiting states or the federal government from requiring
any different warnings." '192 Cigarette manufacturers were at liberty
under the Act to include additional warnings concerning the health risks
of smoking. To conclude otherwise would have been to "'conclude that
Congress legislated to curtail the potential flow of information lest the
public learn too much about the hazards of smoking for the good of the
tobacco industry and the economy.' ,,193
The Palmer court concluded that since tort compensation has tradi-
tionally been an area of state concern, a conclusion of preemption would
be unwarranted absent express preemption in the statute or in its legisla-
tive history. Judge Mazzone was unwilling to find implied preemption in
this case where Congress, aware of common-law tort claims, remained
silent and chose to tolerate any tension which this silence caused. The
court noted that any solution designed to address burgeoning litigation in
this field must come from Congress and not the courts.
1 9 4
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
The preemption issue on which courts have disagreed is whether
state common-law tort claims against cigarette companies for failure to
warn stand as an obstacle to the purposes of Congress and, therefore,
actually conflict with the federal legislation. Two elements are necessary
to a finding of frustration of congressional purpose in the cigarette cases.
First, it must be shown that Congress intended to legislate uniformity of
labeling on cigarette packages, not merely uniformity of regulation of
such labeling. Courts have not addressed this distinction squarely, hav-
ing omitted or presumed it. That uniformity of labeling was a purpose of
Congress in passing the Act is yet to be shown. If uniformity of labeling
190. Id. (footnote omitted).
191. Id. at 1178.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1968)).
194. Id. at 1179-80.
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is not required, then the federal label is, by definition, a minimum re-
quirement which the cigarette companies may voluntarily enhance with-
out frustrating congressional purpose.
Furthermore, even if the courts find that Congress intended uni-
formity of labeling, they must also find that money judgments against
cigarette companies amount to regulation of labeling inconsistent with
the purposes of the Act and its preemption clause. If money judgments
do not regulate in a way which Congress intended to preempt, then even
the requirement of label uniformity would not preclude the possibility of
manufacturer's culpability. Both elements are required for a finding of
preemption of the failure-to-warn claims.
A. The Reasoning of the Courts
Six federal courts have certified opinions' 95 deciding whether a
plaintiff's common-law tort claim for failure to warn adequately is pre-
empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as
amended.196 All six courts have agreed that failure-to-warn claims are
neither expressly preempted by the Act, nor impliedly preempted by a
congressional design to regulate pervasively cigarette labeling, thereby
"occupying the field."' 97 Neither do these opinions hold that plaintiffs'
common-law claims conflict with the Act due to physical impossibility of
complying with both state tort judgments and federal regulation.
98
Courts which have found implied preemption of state common-law
claims have found those claims conflicted with the purposes of Congress
in passing the Act. In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' 99 the
court held that the common-law claims were "incompatible" with the
federal legislation because exposing a manufacturer to liability for doing
no more than complying with the Act would achieve indirectly what the
Act had expressly preempted.2" The Third Circuit in Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc. 201 applied the principle that state common-law damage
claims have a regulatory effect on defendants, and concluded that such
claims effectively tip the Act's balance of purposes and, therefore, actu-
ally conflict with the Act.2"2 This Comment next examines more closely
195. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 9.
197. See generally supra text accompanying notes 124-94.
198. See generally supra text accompanying notes 124-94.
199. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), appealfiled, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20,
1986).
200. See supra text accompanying note 165.
201. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76.
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preemption based on conflict with congressional purpose. It will first re-
view the bases on which two courts have found that failure-to-warn
claims do not conflict with the Act's purposes and then compare the
analyses of two courts which have arrived at the opposite conclusion.
In Cipollone,2 °3 District Court Judge Sarokin held that common-law
claims posed no obstacle to congressional purpose, primarily because
Congress intended that state common law survive the Act.204 The court
found two congressional purposes manifest in the Act: (1) to ensure the
continued vitality of the tobacco industry" 5 in order to preserve the free-
dom of choice of the individual smoker as well as the health of the econ-
omy, and (2) to combat a growing health problem through concise and
unambiguous warning labels designed to inform the public of the risks
associated with smoking.2 °6 While the Act expressly preempted a state
requirement of additional labeling, the court held that additional
stronger labeling by manufacturers would not conflict with the congres-
sional purpose because "Congress feared not stronger, but weaker state-
ments; only the former would be encouraged by state tort recoveries. "20 7
The court held that even if this were not true, common-law tort judg-
ments are not the same as regulation because they do not require multi-
ple or conflicting labels. "Plaintiffs may not prevail in these lawsuits and,
if they do, manufacturers may not respond to such suits by altering their
labels or changing their advertising practices. "208
While Congress may have assumed that common-law tort actions
would be preserved under the 1965 Act,20 9 it is not facially clear that
Congress feared only "weaker" statements on cigarette packages. As de-
fendants evidently pointed out in their brief to the district court,2 0 the
203. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on interlocu-
tory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
204. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
205. The district court noted that one of the ways in which Congress sought to assure the
continued vitality of the cigarette industry was by mandating uniformity of labeling. Cipol-
lone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169.
206. Id at 1166.
207. Id. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
208. Id. at 1169.
209. "The legislative records make it clear that the passage of this law and compliance by
the manufacturer in no way affects the right to raise the defense of an 'assumption of the risk'
and the legal requirement for such a defense to prevail ...." I ll CONG. REC. 16,544 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Fascell). See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1162-63, for a thorough discussion
of this issue.
210. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169-70. "[D]efendant's arguments that, were the Act to
result in added warnings, it would dilute the effectiveness of the warnings that now exist,
thereby undermining the primary purpose of the Act, is without merit." Id.
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legislative history of the Act indicated congressional concern that clear
communication to the cigarette smoker would be impeded by confusing
and diverse labeling.2" Following this logic, to state that Congress
feared only weaker statements would be untrue. Rather, if consumers
were the primary beneficiaries of a uniformity requirement, Congress
would have feared any statements which could tend to confuse the con-
sumer. Thus, any additional label, stronger or weaker, may have been
contrary to the intent of the Congress in 1965.212
Defendants' argument that they were not the sole beneficiaries of a
uniform labeling requirement appears disingenuous. The implication of
that argument is that Congress intended to protect consumers through
uniformity of labeling by denying them the benefit of more effective vol-
untary labeling. Furthermore, both defendants' and the court's analyses
fail to distinguish between the effectiveness concerns of Congress when it
evaluated proposed labels under the Act, and uniformity concerns when
it expressly preempted alternative regulation of labeling by the states and
their political subdivisions. Congress discussed effectiveness only in the
context of the content of the federally mandated labels. It considered
uniformity only in the context of regulation of labeling, both in the plain
wording of the Act,213 and in the legislative history of the 1965 Act.214
Every statute regulates, and therefore occupies, some field. Courts
must address and decide what field Congress was regulating with the
Act. If Congress intended to preclude all additional labels in order to
protect consumers, then Congress pervasively has regulated and occu-
pied the field of labeling permitted on cigarette packages. Yet, no court
has held that cigarette companies may not voluntarily enhance the feder-
ally required warning labels with additional effective warnings. The
211. The Senate Commerce Committee Report stated:
[W]hile the Committee believes that the individual must [be] safeguarded in his free-
dom of choice.., we believe equally that the individual has the right to know that
smoking may be hazardous to his health.
Therefore the Committee is satisfied that the public interest requires the inclu-
sion of a fair and factual cautionary statement on every cigarette package.
Such cautionary statement should be short and direct, and should not be weak-
ened in its impact by any qualifying adjectives, such as "excessive," "continual," or
"habitual."
S. REP. No. 195, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
212. Note that even under the 1984 Act, where there are four labels that are somewhat
longer and more specific than the original label, they are still rotated one at a time, and are
combined with a comprehensive educational program to insure maximum effect on consumer
awareness. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
213. See supra text accompanying note 81.
214. S. REP. No. 195, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1965). "[O]therwise a multiplicity of State
and local regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages could create chaotic market-
ing conditions and consumer confusion." Id.
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plain language of the Act's Declaration of Policy protects "commerce
and the national economy" from being "impeded by . . . diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling . . regulations," '215 but
only to the extent consistent with the primary policy goal of informing
the public of the hazards of smoking.216 The commercial interest is sub-
servient to the consumer interest. Commerce benefits from the uniform-
ity of regulation requirement, and consumers benefit from information
contained in the warning labels. Thus, it appears more correct to say
that Congress feared neither stronger nor weaker labels, but feared inef-
fective warnings resulting from alternative labeling required by the states
and their political subdivisions.
Under this analysis, congressional purpose will not be frustrated by
voluntary additional labeling, unless such labeling negates the effect of
the federally mandated labeling scheme. This interpretation follows
because the primary intended beneficiaries of uniformity of labeling regu-
lation are commerce, the cigarette companies and their chains of distri-
bution, not consumers. To determine whether additional labels will
negate the federal scheme, courts should determine whether the addi-
tional labels are stronger than those federally mandated. As Judge
Sarokin has stated, weaker labels will frustrate the purpose of Congress.
They frustrate the congressional purpose, however, because they negate
the federal warning label, not because they are proscribed by a uniform-
ity of labeling requirement in the Act. If cigarette companies are permit-
ted to add stronger warnings to cigarette packages, then it would follow
that consumers should be given the opportunity to show that the compa-
nies' failure to do so has caused injury.
A second issue is whether common-law liability amounts to a "re-
quirement" or "prohibition" as used in the Act. One court has held that
"[r]egulation can be as effectively asserted through an award of damages
as through some form of preventive relief." '217 Yet, the Supreme Court
held in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.2" 8 that where: (1) there is no indi-
cation that Congress considered precluding common-law remedies; (2)
Congress has failed to provide a remedy for persons injured by the con-
duct; and (3) the only congressional discussion concerning state tort rem-
edies assumed that such remedies would be available, state tort law
remedies, though regulatory as well as compensatory in nature, were not
215. See supra text accompanying note 81.
216. Id.
217. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
218. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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preempted.219 The Silkwood Court upheld a common-law punitive dam-
age award even though the federal government had occupied the field of
nuclear safety.220
All three criteria are present in the legislation and legislative history
of the Act. Furthermore, the Silkwood Court looked to language in the
congressional debate preceding passage and amendment of the, inappli-
cable but related, Price-Anderson Act which expressly left state tort law
remedies intact.2 21 Legislation regarding smokeless tobacco also ex-
pressly reserves state tort law remedies. Although it does not apply to
cigarette legislation, it is related. It also expressly preserves state tort law
remedies.222
Silkwood can be distinguished because evidence was presented at
trial which showed that the defendant had not always complied with Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission regulations;223 therefore, its conduct was
not equivalent to the conduct of cigarette companies which comply with
the federal statute. The burden of proving the preemptive intent of Con-
gress, however, remains with the defendant. Further, the presumption is
weighted heavily against a defendant when the field to be preempted tra-
ditionally is one of state concern. 24
219. Id. at 251. In Silkwood, the Court determined whether punitive damages awarded to
the estate of a former employee, fatally injured by plutonium which escaped from a federally
licensed nuclear facility, were preempted. Preemption was possible under the theory that
either the federal government had occupied the field of nuclear safety regulation or because
there was a conflict with some other aspect of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Id. at 241.
The original action, brought by Karen Silkwood's father, was a common-law tort claim
brought under Oklahoma law to recover for contamination injuries to Karen's person and
property. Id. at 243. After an award of $10 million in punitive damages, Kerr-Mcgee moved
for judgment n.o.v. on the basis that compliance with federal regulations precluded an award
of punitive damages. IL at 245. The lower court disagreed because the congressional stan-
dard of maintaining radiation releases "as low as reasonably achievable" could not be demon-
strated by showing control of escaped plutonium within any absolute amount. Id. Thus, it
was not "'inconsistent [with congressional design] to impose punitive damages for the escape
of plutonium caused by grossly negligent, reckless and willful conduct.'" Id. (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 603 (1979), affd, 637 F.2d 743 (1980),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984)). The appeals court reversed this portion of the opinion and found
preemption to apply. Id. at 246.
220. Id. at 257 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)).
221. The Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 221 (1982)), was an indemnification scheme which amended the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. It limited liability for any one nuclear accident to $560 million, $60 million in private
protection and $500 million in government indemnification. Price-Anderson, and its amend-
ment, expressly left state law remedies intact. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-53.
222. See supra text accompanying note 121.
223. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 243.
224. Id. at 255.
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If money judgments do not regulate in a way which Congress in-
tended to preempt, then even the requirement of label uniformity would
not preclude the possibility of a manufacturer's culpability. Judge
Sarokin cited Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 225 for the proposition that
common-law tort judgments are not the same as regulation because they
do not require multiple or conflicting labels.226 He reasoned that plain-
tiffs may not prevail in these lawsuits and even if they do, manufacturers
may not respond to such suits by altering their labels or changing their
advertising practices. Yet, in Ferebee, administrative guidelines set up by
the Environmental Protection Agency clearly were a minimum labeling
requirement, leaving defendants to provide a stronger warning if they so
chose. The federal legislation required only that labeling be "adequate to
protect health and the environment" and be "likely to be read and under-
stood." '227 The warnings on cigarette packages have been legislated ver-
batim by Congress.
While the defendant in Ferebee was permitted to add a more strin-
gent warning label to its product, courts have not determined that Con-
gress intended cigarette companies to have the same power. Under the
analysis of Ferebee as applied to this situation, cigarette companies would
be held responsible for payment of common-law tort claims against
them, even if required to provide the exact label on which judgment
against them was based. "[lit need not be the case.., that the company
can be held liable for failure to warn only if the company could actually
have altered its warning. '  Either of two results would flow from ap-
plication of this analysis to cigarette labeling. Cigarette companies
would continue to litigate and defeat plaintiffs' substantive tort claims.
Alternatively, if the companies were to lose, they might petition Congress
to legislate stronger warnings. The choice, then, would not be pay the
judgments or strengthen the labels, but pay the judgments or petition
Congress to strengthen the labels. The notion of "choice" is antithetical
225. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Chevron contended that since § 136 v. (b) of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982), prohib-
ited the states from imposing any requirements for labeling additional to or different from
those required by FIFRA, and since damage actions based on inadequacy of label have a
regulatory aim, this action was preempted by state law. The court held that "[d]amage actions
typically... can have both regulatory and compensatory aims." Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
226. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167.
227. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136 (q)(1)(E)).
228. Id. at 1541. The Ferebee court offered no supporting authority for this proposition.
Id. It reasoned that the money judgment itself did not require Chevron to alter its label, but
merely told Chevron that, if it chose to continue selling paraquat in Maryland, it might have to
compensate for some of the resulting injuries. The court determined that "it is not equivalent
to a direct regulatory command that Chevron change its label." Id.
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to the notion of "requirement." Thus, even if Congress intended to re-
quire uniform labeling, money judgments do not amount to a "require-
ment" under state law.
The district court in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.22 9 agreed that
plaintiff's common-law claims did not frustrate the purposes and objec-
tives of the Act. The court noted that Congress struck a balance in the
Act between two somewhat inconsistent goals: (1) labeling which would
adequately inform the public of the health hazards of smoking, and (2)
labeling "requirements" which were not "diverse, nonuniform, and con-
fusing" so as to impede commerce.2 30 The balance was struck by "re-
quiring... a uniform federal warning label, and prohibiting states or the
federal government from requiring any different warnings." '231 While the
court did not squarely address the distinction between "uniformity of
regulation of labeling" and "uniformity of labeling," it held that cigarette
manufacturers are at liberty under the Act to include additional warn-
ings concerning the health risks of smoking. 32 To conclude otherwise
would be to "'conclude that Congress legislated to curtail the potential
flow of information lest the public learn too much about the hazards of
smoking for the good of the tobacco industry and the economy.' "233
Since uniformity of labeling is not required, then the federal label is, by
definition, a minimum requirement which the cigarette companies may
enhance without frustrating the congressional purpose. Yet, if uniform
regulation of labeling were designed to protect the consumer as well as
the manufacturer, this last quote would be inapposite, and the Palmer
decision would be subject to the same weaknesses potentially found in
Cipollone.
In 1986, during debate over the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
and Health Education Act of 1986,234 the most recent federal legislation
regulating the tobacco industry, Congress exhibited continuing concern
with the effect of nonuniform regulation of labeling on commerce.235
229. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appealfiled, No. 86-8019 (Ist Cir.
June 4, 1986).
230. Id. at 1178.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1968)).
234. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986).
235. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179. "'[D]ifferent labels [are] far more injurious to com-
merce than inappropriate and ill-advised uniform labeling requirements of the Congress.'" Id.
(quoting 132 CONG. REC. H250 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1986)).
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Yet, the plain language23 6 and legislative history23 7 of the Smokeless Act
expressly allows additional labels, and expressly preserves the right of
individual plaintiffs to bring common-law tort claims for failure to warn
adequately.238 Since the Act and the Smokeless Act are nearly identical
in language, purpose and implementation, 239 one might infer that the
burden on commerce Congress feared was diverse regulation, not diverse
labeling. The Palmer court should have held that uniform regulation of
warnings, not "uniform warnings, ' ' 240 was the congressional purpose.
In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,24 1 District Judge Hull
held that the common-law claims were "incompatible" with the federal
legislation because exposing a manufacturer to liability for doing no more
than complying with the Act would achieve indirectly what the Act had
expressly preempted.242 The Roysdon court relied on a 1963 preemption
case, Sperry v. Florida,243 which held that a state law must yield when
incompatible with federal legislation. 2' Yet Sperry is inapposite to the
present issue because it dealt with state law which was incompatible with
the express purpose of the legislation.
In Sperry, petitioner was a registered patent agent who was not a
lawyer. Though he was registered to practice before the United States
Patent Office, the Florida Supreme Court enjoined him from preparing
and prosecuting patent applications in the State of Florida, holding that
such conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law.245
Congress had provided that the Commissioner of Patents could pre-
scribe regulations governing eligibility of persons to practice before the
Patent Office, and the Commissioner had provided for representation by
either an attorney or authorized agent.246 "The statute thus expressly
permits the Commissioner to authorize practice before the Patent Office
by nonlawyers, and the Commissioner has explicitly granted such au-
thority."2 47 The state's power to proscibe appellant's activity was thus
236. The Smokeless Act includes a "savings clause." See supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
237. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
238. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
239. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
240. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179.
241. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
242. See supra text accompanying note 165.
243. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
244. Id. at 384.
245. Id. at 381-83.
246. Id. at 384.
247. Id. at 385.
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preempted by the expressed intent of the federal code.24 8
The critical distinction between Sperry and Roysdon is that Sperry
relies on the express incompatibility of the federal regulation with the
Florida statute, while Roysdon relies on its own projection that a money
judgment would be incompatible with the inferred intent of Congress. In
Sperry, the appellant had no control over the additional conditions which
the state imposed upon his practice. The defendant in Roysdon could
choose to settle out of court, defend the substantive claim, pay any ad-
verse judgment without changing the labels that appear on cigarette
packages, or add a stronger label for its protection against future failure-
to-warn suits. Judge Hull pointed out that "congressional intent need
not be expressly stated but may be implied from the structure and pur-
pose of the particular statute."'2 49 From the express Declaration of Pol-
icy,25 Judge Hull drew the inference that Congress had two, presumably
equally important, purposes in mind: informing the public of the health
hazards related to smoking and uniformity of labeling.251 Once again, a
court failed to emphasize the distinction between "uniformity of label-
ing" and "uniformity of regulation of labeling." Yet the second purpose,
even if accurately interpreted, is meaningless except in relation to the
first.
The principal policy of the Act was to inform the public ade-
quately,2" 2 and the qualification, the second purpose, was that the man-
ner of informing the public should protect the economy wherever
possible. One method of protecting the economy is to insure that label-
ing is not subject to "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing labeling...
regulations" among the states.253 The Act's "Declaration of Policy"
states that commerce and the economy need be protected only "to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy. '25 4 There is no
248. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (1986).
249. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190 (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982)).
250. See supra text accompanying note 81.
251. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
252. H. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2350. "The principal purpose of the bill is to provide adequate warning
to the public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking .. " 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2350.
253. See supra text accompanying note 81. "[S]uch a requirement as to labeling should be
uniform; otherwise, a multiplicity of State and local regulations pertaining to labeling of ciga-
rette packages could create chaotic marketing conditions and consumer confusion." 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352.
254. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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declared policy other than to adequately inform the public and to do so
by including a federally mandated label on each cigarette package.
As noted above, it is not clear that uniformity of labeling, as com-
pared with uniformity of labeling regulation, was a purpose of the Act.
Certainly, it was not a "stated intent. '255 Congress intended to preempt
state regulation of cigarette labeling and advertising, but had not consid-
ered regulation of common-law claims. Remaining to be determined are:
(1) whether uniformity of labeling was a purpose of Congress in passing
the Act, and, if it were, (2) whether money judgments against cigarette
companies for failure to warn adequately amount to regulation of label-
ing inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and its preemption clause.
The Roysdon court presumed, but did not analyze, these issues. Since the
contrary purposes of Congress are a necessary ingredient to a finding of
incompatibility of state action, the Roysdon decision is not complete and
should not stand as precedent in this area.
On appeal, the Cipollone case256 was disposed of by the Third Cir-
cuit's finding of implied preemption of the Cipollones' claims. The Third
Circuit reversed the district court's ruling striking appellants' preemp-
tion defenses on the basis that appellee's failure-to-warn claims actually
conflicted with the Act. In order to determine whether a conflict exists
"[t]he test enunciated by this court... requires us 'to examine first the
purposes of the federal law and second the effect of the operation of state
law on these purposes.' "257 Citing Banzhaf v. Federal Communications
Commission,258 the Third Circuit held that the explicit language of the
Act's purposes25 9 "represents a carefully drawn balance between the pur-
poses of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and pro-
tecting the interests of the national economy. 
' 260
Banzhaf was the only case to interpret the Act prior to Judge
Sarokin's 1984 opinion in Cipollone. In Banzhaf, broadcasters joined the
Tobacco Institute, Inc. in appealing a Federal Communications Commis-
sion ruling requiring radio and television stations which carried cigarette
advertisements to also broadcast messages against smoking.261 The
Banzhaf court's analysis of the Act's purposes should be understood in
context.
255. Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
256. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
257. Id. at 187 (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
258. 405 F.2d 1082, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
259. See supra text accompanying note 83.
260. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
261. See Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1085.
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In short, we think the Cigarette Labeling Act represents
the balance drawn between the narrow purpose of warning the
public "that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health"
and the interests of the economy. In that reckoning, the ques-
tion of the public's need for information about the nature, ex-
tent, and certainty of the danger was left out of the scales, and
so is left unaffected, except incidentally, by the result. Congress
may reasonably have concluded that a warning on each pack
was adequate warning. It surely did not think the warnings
were themselves adequate information. And we find no suffi-
ciently persuasive evidence that Congress hoped to impede the
flow of adequate information for fear that, if the public knew all
the facts, too many of them would stop smoking.
This relatively narrow reading of the Act is not in conflict
with its declared objective of protecting commerce and the na-
tional economy against "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to
any relationship between smoking and health." Congress pa-
tently did not want cigarette manufacturers harassed by con-
flicting affirmative requirements with respect to the content of
their advertising.262
The court held that "[s]ince the Commission's ruling does not require the
inclusion of any 'statement ... in the advertising of any cigarettes,' but
rather directs stations which advertise cigarettes to present 'the other
side' each week, it does not violate the letter of the Act." '263
The quoted language illustrates that the balance found by Chief
Judge Bazelon in Banzhaf is a narrow reading of the federal legislation
in order to avoid preemption of regulatory action by the Federal Com-
munications Commission. The court implied that the balancing of public
and commercial interests necessarily made the congressional purpose
narrow. In light of that compromise, the Banzhaf court found no greater
meaning in the intent of the Act than the plain meaning of its words.
There was no doubt that negative broadcast publicity potentially would
be damaging to the cigarette industry and to the economy. 2" Yet, the
court's construction of congressional intent limited the proscriptions of
262. Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 1088 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. 1966)).
264. This, in fact, turned out to be the case following the broadcast of antismoking commer-
cials pursuant to Banzhaf. "For the first time in years, the statistics began to show a sustained
trend toward lesser cigarette consumption." Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000
(1972).
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the Act to "conflicting affirmative requirements" and the requirement of
inclusion of statements in cigarette advertising.
The Third Circuit, too, read the Act's preemption clause and its
Declaration of Purpose, and found that they made clear "Congress's de-
termination that this balance would be upset by... a requirement of a
warning other than that prescribed.... "265 At this point, the two courts
parted ways. The Banzhaf court held that only requiring the inclusion of
a warning, other than that mandated by the Act, was preempted. The
Third Circuit found preemption in the regulatory effect of common-law
claims.
266
Common-law claims, the Third Circuit reasoned, in effect tip the
Act's balance of purposes, and therefore, actually conflict with the
Act.267 Yet, the Banzhaf court found the balance of public and economic
interests already drawn in favor of preempting only labeling require-
ments. A defendant in a failure-to-warn case is not required to include
additional warnings. Banzhaf supports the argument that Congress did
not seek to preempt the flow of information to the public, but only the
affirmative requirement of additional labeling. Nothing short of that is
inconsistent, incompatible, or an obstacle to Congress' purpose in legis-
lating the Act.
Absent its use of the Banzhaf decision for its analysis, the Third
Circuit has failed to analyze how money judgments against cigarette
companies for failure to warn adequately amount to regulation of label-
ing inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and its preemption clause.
Like the Roysdon court, the Cipollone appellate court has not analyzed
how it came to its presumption that uniformity of labeling was a purpose
of Congress in passing the Act. Furthermore, money judgments may not
regulate in a way which Congress intended to preempt.26 Thus, without
further analysis, it may be inaccurate to state that "where the success of a
state law damage claim necessarily depends on the assertion that a party
bore the duty to provide a warning to consumers in addition to the warn-
ing Congress has required on cigarette packages, such claims are pre-
empted as conflicting with the Act.1
269
B. Congressional Purpose: Legislative Analysis
From its inception, the primary purpose of the Federal Cigarette
265. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
266. See supra text accompanying note 178.
267. Id.
268. See supra text accompanying note 228.
269. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
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Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended,27 was to provide adequate
warning to the public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking. This
is clearly stated in the legislative history of the 1965 Act.271 The 1969
Act strengthened the warning message in the face of reports that the first
label had been ineffective and a stronger message was needed.272 Inform-
ing Americans of the adverse health effects of smoking was also the pur-
pose of the 1984 Act.273 The 1984 Act again strengthened the
mandatory labels, requiring four statements to be rotated on a quarterly
basis.274 The 1984 Act also combined its labeling requirements with
broad-based educational efforts to assist smokers in quitting and to dis-
courage young people from starting smoking.
275
The second purpose of the federal legislation was to inform the pub-
lic in such a way as to protect the economy wherever possible. One way
to protect the economy was to insure that labeling was not subject to
"diverse, nonuniform, and confusing labeling... regulations" among the
states.276 Similarly, Congress intended to protect consumers from confu-
sion resulting from a multiplicity of additional required state and local
labeling schemes.277 Voluntary additional labels which are stronger than
those federally mandated will not confuse consumers and, therefore, will
not frustrate congressional purpose.
The Declaration of Policy states that uniform regulation of warn-
ings, not uniform warnings, is the desired secondary congressional goal.
Similarly, the courts, more often than not, have construed the intent of
Congress as it relates to regulation of warning, not uniformity of warn-
ing. "[T]here are positive indications that Congress's 'comprehensive
program' was directed at the relatively narrow specific issue of regulation
of 'cigarette labeling and advertising.' "278 Yet, courts have not analyzed
the distinction.
270. See supra notes 8-9.
271. See supra text accompanying note 80.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
273. See supra text accompanying note 104.
274. See supra text accompanying note 106.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
276. See supra text accompanying note 81.
277. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
278. Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
accord Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on
interlocutory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563). Contra Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
1171, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), appealfiled, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986) ("It required nationally
uniform warning labels ....").
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Because the wording in the Declaration of Policy is so clear, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to establish a maximum as well as a min-
imum uniform warning standard. Congress expressed its intent to in-
form the public and to do so in such a way that, wherever possible, it
would not jeopardize the national economy in the process. Certainly
Congress would not object to a more informative warning imposed by the
cigarette companies, absent the consideration that the warning might be
confusing to the extent of negating its effect. "In almost every instance,
government standards are meant to fix a level of performance below
which one should not fall.",
279
The legislative history of the Act provides evidence with which to
answer the independent question of whether a common-law tort claim
amounts to a "requirement" or "prohibition" within the meaning of
Congress. Congressional debate prior to the passage of the 1965 Act rec-
ognized the continued existence of common-law products liability cases
and the negative effect which the required warnings might have on a
plaintiff's cause of action for failure to warn.280 "[I]f Congress had
meant to bar warning-related litigation, that discussion would never have
taken place." '281 The primary goal of the preemption clause in the 1965
Act was to preempt the executive branch of state government from prop-
erly exercising its police powers by requiring labels in addition to those
federally mandated.282 The preemption clause of the 1969 Act was di-
rected at regulation by states or their political subdivisions, specifically at
"statutes," "administrative actions," and "local ordinances and regula-
tions." '283 The Smokeless Act, which was Congress' first tobacco legisla-
tion following the decision in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,284
was nearly identical to the 1984 Act in purpose, language and implemen-
tation.285 Yet, the legislative history of the Smokeless Act makes clear
the congressional intent to allow additional warnings and to preserve
common-law claims for failure to warn adequately against manufacturers
which have complied with the federally mandated labeling
requirements.286
Analyzed in its entirety, the legislative history of tobacco legislation
279. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1170.
280. Id. at 1162-63 (citing 111 CONG. REc. 16,543-16,545 (1965)).
281. Tribe, supra note 1, at 789.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
283. See supra text accompanying note 98.
284. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), appealfiled, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20,
1986).
285. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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over the past twenty-two years indicates a congressional intent to pre-
empt state regulation exclusive of common-law judgments. Each new
preemption clause has become more precise and specific, lending support
to Judge Sarokin's statement that Congress originally indicated its intent
to occupy a field "as clearly as it knew how," and that "the field it occu-
pied does not encompass the common-law products liability claims here
asserted.
'287
IV. PROPOSAL
While the issue may be complex and elusive, the alternative resolu-
tions are simple. If Congress does not clarify its intent, courts will con-
tinue to split their decisions on this issue until the Supreme Court grants
certiorari.288 Since the first case which held that failure-to-warn cases
were preempted,289 Congress has not legislated with regard to cigarette
labeling. Yet it passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health
Education Act in February of 1986.290 In the legislative history of that
act, and in the legislation itself, Congress clearly stated that additional
warnings were permitted and it did not intend to preempt common-law
tort claims for failure to warn.29' The Smokeless Act and the 1984 Act
are almost identical in design, purpose, and method of implementa-
287. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1164.
288. The United States Supreme Court denied petition for writ of certiorari to hear the
Cipollone case on January 12, 1987, with Justice Powell taking no part in the decision. 55
U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563). The petition, filed on October 6, 1986,
presented the question "[w]hether a state authorized award of compensatory damages against
a cigarette manufacturer arising from the inadequacy of health warnings provided to its cus-
tomers and its improper advertising practices is preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act." Petition for Writ of Cetitorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd
on interlocutory appeal and remanded, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 55 U.S.L.W.
3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563), reprinted in 1.10 TPLR 3.365.
Petitioner sought the writ on four bases:
1. the decision affects the states [sic] authority to provide tort remedies; 2. the
opinion conflicts with other federal and state court opinions; 3. the decision is in
conflict with the decision in... Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee; and 4. resolution of the
preemption question would promote [a] speedy and consistent determination of the
preemption issue in other product liability actions involving cigarettes and other
products.
1.10 TPLR 3.365. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will deny a second
petition for writ of certiorari arising from a state supreme court or federal circuit decision
which conflicts with the holding of the Third Circuit. See Gidmark, supra note 2, at 9, col. 4.
289. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal
filed, No. 86-5072 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1986).
290. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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tion.192 The court in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. 293 analyzed the most
recent tobacco legislation as follows:
Congress must have been acutely aware during the period
the bill was pending-July, 1985 to February, 1986-of cases
like Cipollone and Roysdon in which cigarette manufacturers
were arguing that the federal cigarette labeling requirements
preempted common law claims .... It seems certain ... that
Congress believes that allowing products liability suits involv-
ing the adequacy of cigarette warnings will not frustrate its
objectives of uniform warnings.2 94
The solution is for the courts to agree that Congress did not intend
to promote uniformity of labeling, but only uniformity of regulation of
labeling. Since the language of the Act states that uniformity of regula-
tion of labeling is required, the burden of analysis rests with the courts to
overcome a presumption of clarity. When courts analyze this distinction,
they should hold that Congress intended mandatory labels to be a mini-
mum standard-a minimum standard with a qualification. The qualifi-
cation was that federal, state, and local regulations and statutes affecting
labeling were preempted by the Act. Thus, cigarette companies should
remain free to enhance the federal labeling scheme provided they do not
negate the effect of the mandatory labels.
Furthermore, courts should resolve the congressional meaning of
"regulation" to determine if, in fact, money judgments against cigarette
companies for failure to warn adequately amount to regulation of label-
ing inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and its preemption clause.
For the reasons that: (1) this area is traditionally occupied by state law;
(2) prospective plaintiffs would be left without an alternative remedy; and
(3) Congress has indicated its intent not to preempt common-law claims
as a remedy in smokeless tobacco litigation, the burden should be
weighted heavily against a finding of preemption. Congressional silence
regarding common-law claims should not be sufficient to meet such a
heavy burden.
Both preceding determinations are required for a finding of preemp-
292. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also Ellington, The Smokeless Tobacco
Industry's Failure to Warn, A Case for the Courts, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 489 (1985), which draws
on facts equating the smokeless tobacco issue with the cigarette issue 22 years ago. Examples
include: widespread use, recognition of a serious problem by health officials, direct link be-
tween use and health problems, lack of awareness of users of the dangers, and failure of manu-
facturers to warn consumers of the dangers. Id. at 489.
293. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appealfiled, No. 86-8019 (1st Cir.
June 4, 1986).
294. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179.
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tion of the failure-to-warn claims. If uniformity is not required, then the
mandatory label, by definition, is a minimum requirement which the cig-
arette companies may enhance. If money judgments do not regulate in a
way which Congress intended to preempt, then even the requirement of
label uniformity would not preclude the possibility of a manufacturer's
liability. While the second issue has been extensively analyzed,295 the
issue of uniformity has been neither explicitly stated nor analyzed,
although it has been presumed. Since lower courts have been unable to
agree on the preemption issue, it is likely the Supreme Court ultimately
will construe the Act.
Alternatively, it is incumbent upon Congress to clarify its intent.
This could be accomplished by adding a sentence to the end of the pre-
emption clause of the Act: "We do (not) intend by this legislation to
preempt existing rights of private citizens to bring common-law claims
against manufacturers for failure to warn adequately of the potential and
actual dangers of smoking tobacco."
V. POLICY JUSTIFICATION AGAINST A FINDING OF PREEMPTION
Donald W. Garner, Professor of Law at Southern Illinois Univer-
sity, predicted the present controversy in 1980, four years before the dis-
trict court opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. :296
Aside from personal defenses, the defendant may assert that
Congress has preempted the entire field of cigarette information
under the old 1965 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
and the subsequent Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969. The courts have rejected the argument that compliance
with a congressional labeling requirement insulates the manu-
facturer from civil liability for failure to adequately warn of
product danger. Statutory or regulatory labels are viewed as
minimum requirements-not as the maximum duty of a de-
fendant to warn of the dangers of his product. Cigarette produ-
cers will quickly point out, however, that the labeling Act not
only requires a cigarette warning, but have [sic] also provided
that no other statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required.
[ . . T]he question of whether a civil court has lost its
power to award damages based on failure to adequately warn of
295. See generally supra text accompanying notes 124-94.
296. 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd on interlocutory appeal and remanded,
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1987) (No. 86-563).
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addiction should be resolved in the smoker's favor.2 97
While the determination of preemption is based solely on a judicial inter-
pretation of the expression or intention of Congress, it may be useful to
determine what a finding of preemption would preempt.
4. Preemption Would Preempt the Congressional Purpose
Potential tort recovery will further Congress' primary purpose of
informing the public of the health hazards of cigarettes. Publicity from
the lawsuits will provide information to the public. Cigarette companies
might increase the money they spend informing the public and seeking
legislation for stronger warnings. Only since 1984 has Congress legis-
lated more thorough warnings on cigarette packages which inform the
public of several specific hazards of smoking. 298 Yet, other hazards re-
main unlabeled.
Even though smoking was condemned as addictive as early as
1604,299 the critical issue of addiction to nicotine has not yet been ad-
dressed on a warning label. The Federal Trade Commission has reported
that fifty percent of adult Americans do not know that cigarette smoking
creates physical and psychological dependency, a fact particularly impor-
tant to those who have not yet started smoking. °°
Dependency ... adds a new dimension to the law's re-
sponse to smoking injuries. The basis for the tobacco industry's
freedom from liability is the consumer's knowledge and appre-
297. Garner, supra note 7, at 1453 (footnotes omitted).
298. See supra text accompanying note 108.
299. Comment, Smoking In Public: This Air is My Air, This Air is Your Air, 4 S. ILL. L.J.
665, 665 n.1 (1984).
300. The Federal Trade Commission has studied consumer knowledge and awareness of
various hazards commonly associated with cigarette smoking:
* Over 50% of adult Americans do not know that cigarette smoking is "addictive,"
a fact particularly important for young people deciding whether or not to start
smoking.
* Approximately 40% of high school seniors do not believe that there is a great
health risk in smoking.
* Nearly 50% of all women do not know that smoking during pregnancy increases
the risk of stillbirth and miscarriage.
* Almost 60% of the public is unaware that smoking causes most cases of emphy-
sema and chronic bronchitis.
* Over 30% of the public is unaware that smoking causes heart disease; over 50%
do not know that smoking causes many cases of heart disease.
* While approximately 20% of the public remains unaware that smoking causes
lung cancer, over 40% do not know that smoking causes most cases of lung cancer.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION,
(1981). Contrast this with the fact that 90% of the American public is aware that cigarettes
are hazardous to health. A lower percentage of heavy smokers, 76%, is aware of this fact, and
presumably, they have most frequent contact with the warning labels. See id.
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ciation of all the significant risks of smoking. The critical risk
of addiction, however, has not been disclosed by the cigarette
industry. Additionally, information regarding the magnitude
of this risk has not otherwise been made available to many po-
tential smokers. Consequently, the underpinning of judicial
protection of the tobacco industry is severely weakened.
30 1
Another "unlabeled" finding from a 1972 Surgeon General's Report
stated that "nonsmokers who experienced continual exposure to cigarette
smoke may be subject to a 'serious public health problem.' "302 Subse-
quent reports about passive smoking have "confirmed and broadened"
these findings.3 °3 Smokers indifferent about their own health may still be
disinclined to risk the health of those around them. This information,
especially significant to smokers with families, has yet to appear on a
warning label. If common-law tort claims against cigarette companies
for failure to warn consumers adequately of the hazards of cigarette
smoking are preempted by federal legislation, consumers may have ready
access to less of the information which Congress intended they possess.
B. Preemption Would Preempt Traditional State Interests
In an amicus brief filed in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,3 the At-
torney General of Massachusetts asserted three state interests which
would suffer as a result of a finding of preemption:
First, as a sovereign, [the state] seeks to protect its "traditional
authority to provide tort remedies to [its] citizens." Second, as
parens patriae, it is concerned about those of its citizens who
may have been injured by the purchase of a product as to which
they received inadequate warnings. Third, again as parens pa-
triae, it seeks to protect its citizens from future injuries through
the indirect process of imposition of tort liability in private liti-
gation when such liability is found to exist.30 5
The Attorney General argued that these state interests should not be pre-
empted unless preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of
301. Garner, supra note 7, at 1431.
302. Comment, supra note 299, at 667 (footnote omitted).
303. Id.
304. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appealfiled, No. 86-1525 (1st Cir.
June 4, 1986).
305. Brief of Amicus Curiae Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), interlocutory appeal filed, No. 86-1525 (1st Cir. June
4, 1986), reprinted in 1.9 TPLR 3.335 (citation omitted) [hereinafter Amicus Briefi.
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Congress.3 o6
State tort law reflects state policy relating to concerns of fairness
and utility. Fairness concerns include "corrective justice," allocating
burdens to wrongdoers; "distributive justice," shifting losses to avoid im-
position of catastrophic burdens on individuals; and "benefit-burden"
analysis, allocating burdens to those who enjoy the benefits of an activity.
Utilitarian concerns include "resource allocation," whether consumers
and manufacturers should contract freely for the efficient allocation of
the risk of loss; and "accident-cost optimization," allocating burdens
where it would be least expensive to avoid them. 07 A finding of preemp-
tion would leave a void negating the balance which individual states have
struck on these policies, as well as denying the rights of individual state
citizens to assert their claims.
Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard University, believes that the void left by a finding of preemption
in the cigarette cases may not be limited to the cigarette industry.
It is the broader ramifications of the Third Circuit's ruling
that are most ominous. That court's view of preemption has
the burning force of a prairie fire, and it is hard to see what
structures of state compensation would survive the ensuing
conflagration. Food, drugs, cosmetics and toxic substances are
all governed in some manner by Federal warning laws. If inno-
cent people are injured because of inadequate warnings, or be-
cause advertisements downplay the product's dangers, are all of
them barred by Federal law from pursuing tort claims in state
court? If so, the circuit court's ruling is cause for a knowing
snicker in corporate board rooms across the country. 0
C. Court Implementation of Preemption May Lead
to Unforeseen Results
On remand, Judge Sarokin interpreted the Third Circuit opinion to
hold that:
[N]o claim may be pursued which is predicated upon either the
failure to warn the consuming public of known dangers regard-
ing the risk of smoking, or upon the dissemination of informa-
tion about smoking through advertising and promotion, even if
306. Anicus Brief, reprinted in 1.9 TPLR at 3.339 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
307. See Note, supra note 2, at 818-26, for an extensive discussion of how these policies
should affect plaintiff-conduct defenses in cigarette litigation.
308. Tribe, supra note 1, at 790.
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calculated to deceive or mislead and to encourage existing
smokers to continue and non-smokers to begin. It is ironic...
that deceiving the consuming public and concealing the truth
from it is deemed to be an activity which Congress impliedly
intended to protect in enacting this legislation.3"9
It is possible that Judge Hunter of the Third Circuit might agree
with Judge Sarokin's interpretation of his opinion, but it is almost certain
that Congress did not intend to give the cigarette industry the unique
privilege to "speak what is untrue, conceal what is true, and avoid liabil-
ity for doing so merely by affixing certain mandated warnings to its prod-
ucts and advertising."'3 10 In 1969, Congress expressly exempted the
authority of the Federal Trade Commission "with respect to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes" from what it
had preempted.311 The Senate analysis of this section in the 1969 Act
states that "[t]he Commission remains free to proceed by complaint
against any cigarette manufacturer who it believes is making unfounded
health claims or false claims about the product's characteristics in adver-
tising material." '312 While the authority of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has no direct bearing on private causes of action, that continuing
authority does indicate that Congress did not intend to give the cigarette
companies the license which Judge Sarokin has interpreted the Third
Circuit to establish.
Following the finding of preemption by the Third Circuit, the re-
mand issue regarding which of the Cipollones' claims were preempted
was less than obvious and required a "foray into New Jersey law, in or-
der that [the district court could] determine whether the success of these
claims 'necessarily depend[ed]' on a showing that defendants' warnings
were inadequate."3 3 Thus, it is not clear that a finding of preemption
will lessen the burdens on the court system because following such a find-
ing, the courts may still be required to decide which common-law claims
are preempted.314
309. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986) (emphasis
added).
310. Id.
311. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 7(b), 84 Stat. 89
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1336(b) (1982)); Comprehensive Smoking Educa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 8, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1336) (Supp. III 1985)).
312. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969).
313. Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669.
314. This decision supports the conclusion of the Palmer court that any solution designed
to address burgeoning litigation in this field must come from Congress and not the courts.
Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1180.
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Although interesting, policy concerns are of no consequence to the
finding of preemption. Presumably, Congress made its policy judgments
during the course of legislative enactment. When the Third Circuit de-
termined that Congress intended to preempt common-law tort claims
against cigarette manufacturers for failure to warn consumers adequately
of the risks accompanying cigarette smoking, no other finding was neces-
sary for it to implement that intent. Yet, to construe congressional intent
when considering these claims, courts should first determine whether
Congress intended to mandate uniform labeling or uniform regulation of
labeling of cigarette packages. If the courts decide that Congress man-
dated a uniform label, then they must decide whether tort claims amount
to a "requirement" or "prohibition" within the meaning of the Act.
There are "manifest dangers in trying to discern the tune when listening
to the sounds of Congressional silence.... [T]he benefit of the doubt in
our Federal system is tilted against Federal pre-emption of state law: the
symphonic tie normally goes to the plaintiffs.
315
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolving the preemption issue is not equivalent to resolving the is-
sues presented by substantive claims brought against cigarette compa-
nies. Preemption does not present issues of whether the warnings are
adequate, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the risk, or the injury was, in
fact, caused by cigarette smoking. Rather, preemption presents the issue
of whether Congress intended to allow injured parties to be heard, to
make a case, to have their day in court. If Congress intended to occupy
the field of cigarette labeling by requiring uniformity of labeling, not
merely uniformity of regulation of labeling, then plaintiffs probably have
no right to claim that federally mandated labels provided inadequate
warning of the hazards associated with cigarette smoking. Upon such a
finding, plaintiffs might contend that preemption of common-law claims
amounts to a denial of their due process rights. Yet, the state interest in
protecting its citizens from dangerous products with inadequate warning
labels, no matter how traditional or important, must bow to the demand
of the federal intent. That is the nature of federalism as defined by the
supremacy clause.
Only recently Congress expressed its intent to allow plaintiffs to
bring failure-to-warn suits against tobacco companies. These expressions
came in the context of smokeless tobacco and do not involve cigarettes
directly. The existence of a savings clause in the Smokeless Act could be
315. Tribe, supra note 1, at 788-89.
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helpful to either side of the preemption debate. The more reasonable
interpretation of this legislation, however, is that it expresses the ongo-
ing, unchanging, undiminished intent of Congress not to preclude com-
mon-law causes of action for failure to warn against the tobacco
industry. The sounds of congressional silence have harmonized to a uni-
fied voice, the same unified voice with which Congress passed the Com-
prehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984. Congressional purpose,
language, and debate, taken as a whole, are sufficient evidence from
which to infer that Congress intended to preempt not common-law
causes of action, but only the "requirements" and "prohibitions" of
federal and state regulatory agencies with respect to labeling and
advertising.
Taylor A. Ewell

